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Abstract—Copyright-sensitive videos are commonly leaked or 
illegally distributed by so-called digital pirates. Video owners aim 
to prevent this by hiding a unique watermark in every video that 
contains information about the receiver. If the video is then 
illegally distributed, the copyright owner can extract the 
watermark and identify the malicious consumer. However, pirates 
may manipulate the video in the hope of destroying the embedded 
watermark. Although a variety of imperceptible and robust 
solutions exist, these introduce many artificial distortions to the 
video. Therefore, this paper proposes a novel video watermarking 
approach in which only a single encoder decision is explicitly 
changed. Then, the explicit change automatically propagates into 
a large collection of implicit distortions that represents the 
watermark. The implicit distortions resemble ordinary, encoder-
created compression artifacts and hence are imperceptible. 
Additionally, they prove to be robust against video manipulations. 
Furthermore, the proposed scheme requires no modification of 
existing consumer electronic devices. Consequently, the proposed 
watermarking approach can be applied to help combat piracy 
without bothering innocent users with unnatural distortions. 
 




ONSUMERS of video-on-demand services [1] or users of 
digital video recorders [2] often copy their requested 
content and upload it to torrent sites. Similarly, screeners of 
films and TV series are often leaked on the internet before they 
are officially released [3]. Typical encryption-based security 
measures are not sufficient to protect video owners from 
copyright infringement [4], since so-called digital pirates [5] 
may legally acquire an encrypted video and, thus, decrypt the 
video without a problem. Then, the pirate can illegally 
distribute a copy of the decrypted video on the internet. 
Since traditional, encryption-based security [6]–[9] may fail, 
watermarking should be applied as an extra security measure. 
More specifically, a unique watermark that contains 
information about the receiver should be hidden in every video. 
If a malicious receiver illegally distributes his or her 
watermarked version of the video, he or she can be identified 
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by extracting the watermark out of the video. Since malicious 
consumers may manipulate the video in an effort to destroy the 
watermark, it is important for the watermark to be robust, i.e., 
it should survive video manipulations. Additionally, it is often 
required that the watermark is hidden imperceptibly, such that 
honest consumers are not bothered by the security measure. 
Although a significant volume of research on watermarking 
was conducted in the past two decades, imperceptible and 
robust watermarking still remains a challenging problem [10]. 
This paper evaluates and extends a video watermarking 
technique that was first proposed briefly in previous work [11]. 
As its main novelty, the proposed technique introduces so-
called implicit distortions into the video. These distortions are 
automatically generated by a video encoder, in contrast to 
artificial distortions that are used in the state-of-the-art. The 
embedding scheme is implemented using the High Efficiency 
Video Coding (HEVC) standard, but the underlying ideas are 
applicable to other video coding standards as well. Moreover, 
the scheme requires no modification of existing Consumer 
Electronic (CE) devices, since the videos can be decoded by a 
standard video decoder. In addition to the previously published 
work, this paper proposes a novel watermark extraction scheme 
based on outlier detection and extensively evaluates various 
properties of the proposed watermarking technique. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, Section II 
gives a brief overview of state-of-the-art watermarking 
techniques. Next, the proposed watermarking scheme is 
explained in Section III. Then, Section IV evaluates the method 
by quantifying the amount of implicit distortions, the 
perceptibility, the robustness and the bit rate increase. Finally, 
the conclusion is drawn in Section V. 
II. STATE-OF-THE-ART 
Many watermarking algorithms apply a variation of least-
significant-bit modification on certain pixels or (quantized) 
transform coefficients [3], [12]–[18]. That is because these least 
significant bits can easily be swapped with watermarking 
information without being very perceptible. However, as a 
consequence, attackers can easily delete the watermark since 
they can also change this bit plane without notably degrading 
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the video quality. 
Alternatively, watermarks can be represented as a 
relationship between certain bitstream components. For 
example, Gaj et al. proposed to change the difference in number 
of non-zero coefficients of selected blocks in consecutive intra-
frames [19]. Similarly, Dutta and Gupta suggested to change 
the relationship between the two first non-zero AC coefficients 
of selected blocks in consecutive intra-frames [20]. 
Another common watermark representation is an additive 
noise signal. For example, Kalker et al. proposed a spread-
spectrum technique in which a scaled version of the watermark 
is added as noise [21]. Hartung and Girod proposed a similar 
technique, in which they first added the watermark to a 
pseudorandom noise pattern before adding it to the original 
video [22]. Lastly, Yamada et al. used the watermark as a seed 
to generate a pseudorandom noise pattern that was added to the 
video, while taking the perceptibility of every pixel change into 
account [23]. 
When the watermark is represented by a noise signal, its 
presence is detected by using correlation-based techniques. 
That is, the observed noise in a possibly-watermarked video is 
compared to the noise that represents a watermark. If the 
resulting correlation value exceeds a certain, predefined 
threshold, then the watermark is said to be detected. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to define a universal threshold, 
because the correlation values will vary significantly when 
different attacks are applied [24]. Section III-B explains this 
problem in more detail and proposes a novel extraction 
algorithm as an alternative. 
In general, all existing robust watermarking techniques 
explicitly add many artificial distortions to the video. Even 
though these distortions are usually imperceptible, it is 
questionable whether adding such unnatural distortions is 
desirable. Therefore, this paper contributes to the-state-of-art by 
introducing a new type of imperceptible distortions that are 
added in a more natural fashion. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
A. Watermark Embedding 
As an alternative to existing watermark embedding methods, 
this section proposes a novel approach that adds distortions in 
an implicit way, automatically during video encoding. 
A video encoder creates a compressed video bit stream that 
consists of coding information and a residual signal. The coding 
information describes the structure of the video and attempts to 
predict every region of the video based on other, surrounding 
regions. This prediction is usually not perfect, hence the 
residual signal has to correct the prediction errors. However, in 
order to achieve stronger compression of the video data, the 
residual signal is quantized, leading to a loss of information and 
resulting in compression artifacts. 
In normal circumstances, when compressing a video, the 
coding information consists of coding decisions that were made 
by the encoder. The proposed watermark embedding scheme 
explicitly modifies a single coding decision, while preserving 
all others as when encoding the video without a watermark. 
When a block’s coding decision is explicitly changed, the 
corresponding region will often be predicted differently and 
will therefore usually result in a different quantized residual 
signal. Consequently, this region will produce slightly different 
compression artifacts than when the optimal coding decisions 
were used. In other words, the explicit change introduces so-
called implicit distortions. 
When an implicitly distorted block is used for prediction by 
other blocks, these blocks will be predicted differently as well. 
Thus, more implicit distortions will be generated. Similarly, 
those other blocks will be subsequently used for prediction, 
meaning further propagation of the implicit distortions. As a 
result, implicit distortions will be spread over the whole video 
due to intra- and inter-frame propagation. Fig. 1 illustrates the 
creation of implicit distortions by showing the first frame of the 
video sequence BlowingBubbles, the location of a block in that 
frame of which the intra-prediction mode was explicitly 
changed, and the resulting (imperceptible, implicit) distortion 
map. Additionally, Fig. 2 zooms in on the area around the 
explicitly changed block in both the unwatermarked and 
watermarked frame. In the figure, one can observe that the intra-
prediction mode of the indicated block is slightly changed. 
Note that, since the explicit change is made during the 
encoding process and hence the encoding loop is always closed, 
no drift-error propagation occurs. Instead, the implicit 
distortions are assumed to be imperceptible because the encoder 
still tries to resemble the original video as closely as possible. 
As a result, the introduced distortions are similar to ordinary 
encoding artifacts that always occur during lossy video 
compression, contrary to the artificial distortions created in 
state-of-the-art algorithms. 
Assuming every explicit change results in different implicit 
distortions, a watermark can be represented by a unique explicit 
change, i.e., by the resulting (large) set of implicit distortions. 
However, it is possible that the quantized residual signal of a 
block creates identical compression artifacts with or without an 
explicit change. In this case, the explicit change does not create 
any implicit distortions and thus cannot be used to represent a 
unique watermark. Additionally, even when an explicit change 
does create different compression artifacts in the corresponding 
block, it is possible that the implicit distortions are not spread 
sufficiently over the video. This happens when the block is only 
rarely used as a reference for intra-and inter-frame prediction, 
and the implicit distortions can thus not be propagated 
sufficiently. As a result, there are only few implicit distortions, 
making the corresponding watermark not very robust. 
As a solution to the above-described problems, explicit 
changes that create only few or no implicit distortions should 
not be used to represent a watermark. That is, the amount of 
implicit distortions should be quantified during embedding. 
When this amount is not sufficiently high, another explicit 
change should be used to represent the watermark instead. 
Section IV-C evaluates the effect of eliminating such explicit 
changes on the robustness. 
The proposed embedding scheme was implemented using 
version 16.5 of the HEVC reference Model (HM). However, 
note that the underlying ideas are applicable to other standards 
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as well. The implementation used to evaluate the proposed 
embedding scheme explicitly changes the luma intra-prediction 
mode, which can take 35 different values in HEVC (Planar, DC 
and 33 angles). If the intra-prediction mode is Planar, it is 
changed to DC and the other way around. If the mode is an 
angle, the angle is changed to an adjacent angle. More 
specifically, the angle mode is reduced by one in the case of an 
intra-direction of 17 or 34 and incremented by one in all other 
cases. The explicit changes are only made in intra-frames, in 
order to assure that there are many intra-blocks available to 
create many unique watermarks. In other words, the watermark 
is embedded once every intra-period, which is usually every 
few seconds. 
B. Watermark Extraction 
Because a watermark is represented by a unique collection of 
implicit distortions, one can consider these distortions to be a 
noise pattern that was added to the video. Such unique noise 
patterns are usually detected by using correlation-based 
techniques. However, this section explains why traditional 
correlation-based techniques fail and proposes an alternative, 
novel watermark extraction scheme. 
As mentioned in Section II, correlation-based methods 
correlate the observed noise pattern in a possibly-watermarked 
video with the noise pattern that represents the watermark. 
Several correlation measures exist, such as the correlation 
coefficient ( ccz ), which is an extension of the normalized 
correlation ( ncz ) [3]. These measures are defined in (1), in 
which o  and w  are vectors of pixels, representing the observed 
and watermarked video, respectively. Additionally, | |o  and 
| |w  represent the Euclidean length of o  and w , respectively, 
and o  and w  represent the mean of o  and w , respectively. 
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In traditional correlation-based detection methods, the 
presence of the watermark is detected by comparing the 
calculated correlation value to a certain, pre-defined threshold. 
That is, if the correlation value is higher than the threshold, the 
watermark is detected. However, the correlation value is 
significantly influenced by the type of attack that is performed 
on the video. As a consequence, the correlation value between 
a severely attacked watermarked video and the corresponding 
watermark can be lower than the correlation value between a 
weakly attacked watermarked video and an incorrect 
watermark.  
This problem is illustrated in Fig. 3: all 2433 blocks in the 
first frame of the sequence BlowingBubbles are explicitly 
changed, resulting in 2433 different watermarked videos. Then, 
the watermarked video corresponding to block no. 1000 is 
attacked twice: once by re-encoding it with a Quantization 
Parameter (QP) of 20, and once with a QP of 30. Re-encoding 
the video with a QP of 30 degrades the quality more than re-
encoding it with a QP of 20. In Fig. 3, the correlation values 
between the two attacked videos and all 2433 watermarked 
videos are shown. In both groups of correlation values, the 
correlation with watermark no. 1000 is clearly higher than all 
other correlations within that same group. However, the highest 
correlation value in the lower group (QP 30) is smaller than all 
correlation values in the upper group (QP 20). In other words, 
if it is desired that the watermark can be detected for an attack 
with a QP of 30, the correlation threshold should be set to 
approximately 0.989. But if an attack is performed with a QP of 
20, the correlation values of all watermarks are higher than this 
threshold and would thus all be detected. In other words, it is 
impossible to find a threshold that correctly detects the 
watermark both in case it is attacked with a QP of 20 and 30.  
As a proposed solution, all watermarks should be taken into 
account when performing watermark extraction, instead of only 
 
(a) The first frame of the video BlowingBubbles and the location of the block 
of which the intra-prediction mode is explicitly changed. 
 
(b) Visualization of the resulting implicit distortions. Blue means that the 
corresponding luma pixel value is not changed, whereas red signifies a pixel 
difference of 20 or higher. A luma pixel value is represented by 8 bits. 
Fig. 1.  By explicitly changing a single coding decision of a single block (a), 
many distortions are implicitly created (b). 
     
(a) Unwatermarked decisions    (b) Watermarked decisions 
Fig. 2.  Comparison of the unwatermarked encoder decisions (a) and the 
watermarked decisions (b). The intra-prediction mode of the indicated block 
was explicitly changed from 5 to 6 (or from 67.5° to 75°). 
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a single one. That is, the correlation is calculated with all 
watermarked videos. Then, the watermark corresponding to the 
highest correlation value is detected. In order to have a notion 
of confidence, the extraction scheme should also take into 
account how much the highest correlation value differs from the 
other correlation values. This is proposed to be done by 
performing outlier detection. That is, for every calculated 
correlation value, the distance is calculated to the distribution 
of all other correlation values. Then, the maximum distance 
(i.e., the outlier) corresponds to the detected watermark, with 
the distance as a confidence measure. In the proposed scheme, 
a modified version of the normalized Euclidean distance is used 
as a distance measure and is given in (2). In this equation, x  
represents the investigated correlation value, and µ  and σ  
represent the mean and standard deviation of the distribution of 
all other correlation values, respectively.  
 ( , , )
x
d x
− µµ σ =
σ
 (2) 
In order to provide robustness against collusion attacks, in 
which multiple attackers blend their watermarked versions, 
multiple watermarks should be extracted such that all colluders 
can be identified [3], [6]. In such a case, there will be multiple 
outliers in the distribution of correlations. Therefore, in the 
proposed scheme, not only the watermark corresponding to the 
maximum distance is detected, but also those corresponding to 
distances that are very close to the maximum. Concretely, the 
watermarks corresponding to highest p % of the distances, i.e., 
distances in the range given in (3), are detected. In this range, 
p  represents the desired percentage as a decimal number, max  
the maximum distance, and mean  the mean of the distribution 
of distances. 
 [ ( ), ]range max p max mean max= − ⋅ −  (3) 
Detecting multiple watermarks instead of just a single one, 
increases the probability of a watermark being selected. Thus, 
such a scheme will generally perform better in terms of true 
positive detections, i.e., watermarks being correctly detected. 
However, this also means that more watermarks can be detected 
that should not be detected, i.e., false positive detections. 
Increasing p  will hence allow more true positive detections, 
but also more false positive detections. Thus, p  regulates a 
trade-off between the number of true positive and false positive 
detections. For the evaluation of the proposed scheme in 
Section IV-C, p  is chosen to be 1%, as experimental tests 
demonstrated that this value produces good results. 
In summary, in order to extract the watermark, every 
watermarked video is correlated with the observed, potentially-
attacked video. Then, the distance between every correlation 
value and the distribution of other correlation values is 
calculated. The maximum distances (i.e., the outliers) then 
correspond to the extracted watermarks. 
C. Complexity Analysis 
This section discusses the complexity of the proposed 
watermarking scheme, and therefore its applicability to CE 
devices. Since the watermark embedding is performed on the 
server side, there is no complexity increase on the clients’ 
devices. In fact, the watermark requires no modification of 
existing CE devices, since the videos can be decoded by a 
standard video decoder. 
Although the watermark embedding is performed during 
video encoding, the scheme is scalable. That is because this 
encoding process can be sped up by not recalculating the 
optimal coding decisions. More specifically, the high-
complexity encoder runs only once, encoding the video without 
a watermark. Then, the watermarks are embedded using low-
complexity encoders that use the coding decisions made by the 
high-complexity encoder. As a result, these encoders only need 
to calculate the residual signal. In conclusion, the watermark 
embedding is performed server-side with a low complexity, and 
the amount of resources required by the CE devices are not 
increased by the watermarking process. 
The complexity of the watermark extraction increases 
linearly with the number of video consumers. This is because 
the proposed extraction scheme calculates the correlation with 
all watermarks, in contrast to state-of-the-art watermark 
detection algorithms that calculate only a single correlation. 
However, it is expected that the number of malicious consumers 
is very low compared to the total number of consumers. 
Therefore, a high extraction complexity is not considered a 
problem, since the extraction process happens infrequently. 
Additionally, a single correlation only has to be calculated on a 
short video segment of several seconds, as discussed in 
Section IV-C, thus it is calculated quickly. 
IV. EVALUATION 
In this section, the amount of implicit distortions, the 
perceptibility, the robustness, and the bit rate increase of the 
proposed watermarking scheme are evaluated. 
All test sequences are encoded and watermarked using HM 
v16.5 with the low-delay-main configuration, meaning that 
only the first frame is an intra-frame and all other frames are 
inter-frames (B-frames). Since the watermark is embedded in 
 
Fig. 3.  Two groups of correlation values between all 2433 watermarks and an 
attacked watermarked video. In the upper group, watermarked video no. 1000 
is attacked by re-encoding it with a QP of 20, whereas in the other group, it is 
re-encoded with a QP of 30. In both groups, the correlation with watermark 
no. 1000 is clearly higher than all other correlations within that same group. 
However, the highest correlation value in the lower group is smaller than all
correlation values in the upper group.  
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every intra-frame, every sequence contains the watermark only 
a single time. By only inspecting the first f  frames, intra-
periods of length f  are simulated. 
In each section, the video BlowingBubbles is extensively 
analyzed first. This sequence has a resolution of 416x240 and a 
length of 500 frames. Furthermore, it is encoded with a QP of 
32 and contains 2433 blocks in its first frame. These blocks are 
numbered in zig-zag order from 0 to 2433. Subsequently, 
results from the sequences Traffic, BasketballDrive, 
BasketballDrill, and Johnny are briefly summarized. The 
results of those sequences are analyzed using 100 randomly 
chosen watermarks, instead of using all possible explicit 
changes as watermarks. This is because the computational 
complexity of the robustness test is quadratic in the number of 
used watermarks, as is further explained in Section IV-C. 
A. Amount of Implicit Distortions 
Recall that a watermark is represented by the implicit 
distortions created by an explicit change. This section quantifies 
the collection size by the Sum of Absolute Differences (SAD) 
between the unwatermarked and watermarked video. 
Fig. 4 provides some illustrative examples of the effect of the 
position of the explicit change and of the number of used 
frames. In Fig. 4 (a), unwatermarked frames 1, 50, and 500 of 
the sequence BlowingBubbles are given. In Fig. 4 (b), (c), and 
(d), the corresponding implicit distortions are visualized after 
explicitly changing a block in the upper-left corner, middle, and 
lower-right corner of the first frame, respectively.  
The following observations can be made from Fig. 4. First, 
there are more implicit distortions present in later frames than 
in earlier frames. This is because of inter-frame propagation. 
That is, if more frames are available for inter-frame prediction, 
the probability that implicit distortions are propagated is larger. 
Secondly, Fig. 4 shows that an explicit change in the upper-left 
corner contains considerably more implicit distortions in the 
first frame(s) than explicit changes in the lower-right corner. 
This is because it is more likely for a block in the upper-left 
corner to be used for intra-frame prediction than a block in the 
lower-right corner, because blocks in the upper-left corner are 
encoded earlier in the encoding process.  
Fig. 5 plots the amount of implicit distortions for all 2433 
watermarks that one can create by explicitly changing a single 
block in the first frame of the sequence BlowingBubbles. In 
Fig. 5 (a), the SAD is calculated over only the first frame, 
whereas in Fig. 5 (b), it is calculated over 500 frames. Fig. 5 (a) 
illustrates again that not all explicit changes result in many 
implicit distortions, and blocks in the upper-left corner 
generally create more implicit distortions than blocks in the 
lower-right corner. Fig. 5 (b) illustrates that, given enough 
frames for intra-prediction, almost all explicit changes result in 
many implicit distortions, just as all three examples in Fig. 4 
generate many implicit distortions. However, one can also 
observe that there are some explicit changes that do not create 
any implicit distortions at all, i.e., the resulting SAD is 0. As 
mentioned in Section IV-A, these explicit changes should not 
be used to represent a watermark.  
Table I shows the fraction of watermarks that do not generate 
any implicit distortions at all for some other sequences. 
Similarly to BlowingBubbles, one can observe that these values 
are always relatively low, namely between 0% and 4%. 
In conclusion, the amount of implicit distortions is dependent 
on the location of the explicit change and the number of 
 
(a) Unwatermarked frames. 
 
(b) Explicit change in upper-left corner of the first frame. 
(c) Explicit change in middle of the first frame. 
(d) Explicit change in lower-right corner of the first frame. 
Fig. 4.  Visualization of implicit distortions by explicitly changing different 
blocks. Changing a block in the upper-left corner creates more implicit 
distortions than a block in the lower-right corner. However, given enough 
frames for inter-frame propagation, they all generate many implicit distortions.
 
(a) Amount of implicit distortions over 1 frame. 
 
(b) Amount of implicit distortions over 500 frames. 
Fig. 5.  Amount of implicit distortions of all watermarks, represented as the 
SAD and calculated over (a) 1 frame, and (b) 500 frames. Over 1 frame, not 
all explicit changes create many implicit distortions, whereas over 500 frames, 
almost all explicit changes create many implicit distortions. However, there 
are 17 blocks that do not create any implicit distortions at all. 
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available frames for inter-frame propagation. In addition, a 
fraction of the explicit changes do not create any implicit 
distortions at all. 
B. Perceptibility 
A watermark is embedded by explicitly changing few coding 
decisions during the encoding process. These explicit changes 
generate many implicit distortions, that are assumed to be 
imperceptible because they are ordinary compression artifacts 
that are automatically generated by the video encoder. 
However, the set of coding decisions is not optimal anymore, 
since they do not take the explicit change into account. 
Therefore, the video quality is expected to decrease and the 
watermark may thus be perceptible. This subsection quantifies 
this quality decrease. 
The Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is a widely-used 
metric as an objective video quality measure, but does not 
perform well on measuring perceptual quality. Therefore, in 
this paper, the Structural SIMilarity (SSIM) index is used 
instead, because it takes the structural information into account 
[25]. More specifically, the SSIM between the original and 
unwatermarked video are calculated on the one hand, and 
between the original and a watermarked video on the other. 
Then, the difference of these two results (Δ SSIM) represents 
the quality decrease that results from adding the watermark. In 
addition, the relative differences are calculated for a more 
accurate representation. For example, when watermarking 
BlowingBubbles, the Δ SSIM is approximately 0.005 or, 
relatively, 0.6%, meaning the objective quality decrease is low.  
In addition to evaluating objective quality measures, Fig. 6 
enables a subjective quality evaluation. The figure visualizes 
the watermarked frame that exhibited the highest objective 
quality decrease over all 500 frames of all 2433 watermarked 
versions of BlowingBubbles, and its unwatermarked variant. 
When comparing the unwatermarked and watermarked image, 
it can be observed that there are some regions with perceptible 
differences. Fig. 7 (a) and (c) zoom in on the throat of the left 
girl, showing that the watermarked version of the throat 
contains more perceptible artifacts than the unwatermarked 
version. However, one only notices these differences when 
pausing the videos and comparing the unwatermarked and 
watermarked version side by side. This is not considered a 
problem, since pirates will never have access to the 
(a) Unwatermarked frame. 
(b) Watermarked frame. 
Fig. 6.  The (a) unwatermarked and (b) watermarked frame that correspond to 
the highest observed objective quality. Both frames contain compression 
artifacts and exhibit perceptible differences in a few regions, although these 
are only noticeable when pausing the video and closely inspecting the videos 
side by side. 
TABLE I 
EVALUATION RESULTS OF SEVERAL WATERMARKED SEQUENCES (ENCODED USING A QP OF 32) 
Test sequence Resolution & length 
Fraction of  






Detection rate b False positive rate b 
QP 20 QP 30 QP 40 QP 20 QP 30 QP 40 
(A) Traffic a 2560x1600, 150 frames 0% 0.2% 3.0% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
(B) BasketballDrive a 1920x1080, 500 frames 4% 0.1% 3.6% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
(C) BasketballDrill a 832x480, 500 frames 1% 0.3% 2.9% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
(D) BlowingBubbles 416x240, 500 frames 0.5% 0.6% 4.9% 100% 100% 100% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 
(E) Johnny a 1280x720, 600 frames 0% 0.1% 3.7% 100% 100% 100% 2% 2% 2% 
a Tested on a random subset of 100 watermarks. 
b Using only watermarks with many implicit distortions, i.e., (iii) SAD ≥100 000 . 
      
(a) Unwatermarked throat.      (b) Unwatermarked box. 
      
(c) Watermarked throat.       (d) Watermarked box. 
Fig. 7.  Zoomed-in areas of the (a, b) unwatermarked and (b, c) watermarked 
frame of Fig. 6. The watermarked version of the throat (c) contains more 
perceptible compression artifacts than the unwatermarked version (a). 
However, the watermarked version of the box (d) contains less perceptible 
compression artifacts than the unwatermarked version (b). 
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unwatermarked version. 
Additionally, note that some regions exhibit less perceptible 
compression artifacts in the watermarked version. For example, 
Fig. 7 (b) and (d) zoom in on the orange box on the floor, 
showing that the watermarked version of the box has a better 
quality than the unwatermarked version. Hence, even when 
comparing a watermarked and unwatermarked video, it is very 
hard – if not impossible – to tell which one is which. 
It should be stressed that Fig. 6 and 7 show a frame extracted 
from the video when it was encoded and watermarked with a 
QP of 32. When encoding the video with a lower QP, the 
resulting compression artifacts will be less perceptible. 
Table I shows the average observed relative Δ SSIM values 
for other sequences. Similarly to BlowingBubbles, the other 
sequences have very low Δ SSIM values, varying between 
0.1% and 0.3%, and averaging to 0.26%. 
Unfortunately, state-of-the-art techniques do not use the 
Δ SSIM as a perceptibility metric. Instead, they often use the 
Δ PSNR, or the SSIM between the unwatermarked and 
watermarked video. Therefore, Table II shows the Δ PSNR and 
SSIM of the proposed method, averaged over all tested 
sequences. Additionally, the table compares the obtained values 
with state-of-the-art techniques that have a similar 
computational complexity [16]–[18]. It can be observed that the 
perceptibility results of the proposed method are slightly worse 
than the values reported by Jiang et al. and Chen et al., whereas 
they are slightly better than the method by Ma et al. However, 
it should be stressed that the distortions of the proposed method 
are generated implicitly by the video encoder, in contrast with 
the state-of-the-art techniques that explicitly distort the video.  
In conclusion, there is a small objective quality decrease in 
watermarked videos. However, the resulting different 
compression artifacts are only perceptible upon close inspection 
and when comparing the watermarked frame directly to the 
unwatermarked frame, to which users do not have access.  
C. Robustness 
This section discusses the robustness of the proposed scheme 
and its relation to the amount of implicit distortions. This is 
done using the detection rate and False Positive Rate (FPR). 
First, all watermarks are generated using every possible block 
in the first frame of the video. Then, the watermarked videos 
are all attacked and subsequently extracted. Since the extraction 
complexity is linear in the number of watermarks, the total 
robustness evaluation complexity is quadratic in the number of 
watermarks. The detection rate is calculated by dividing the 
number of true positive detections with the total number of 
watermarks. A true positive detection happens when an 
embedded watermark is correctly detected. Similarly, the FPR 
is calculated by dividing the number of watermarked videos 
with false positive detections by the total number of 
watermarks. A false positive detection happens when a 
watermark is detected in a video in which it was not embedded. 
As discussed in Section V-A, not all explicit changes 
generate an equal amount of implicit distortions. First, some 
explicit changes generate many implicit distortions from the 
first frame until the last. Secondly, some explicit changes result 
in very few distortions in the first frame(s), but propagate to 
many implicit distortions in later frames. Thirdly and lastly, 
some explicit changes do not generate any implicit distortions 
at all. As mentioned in Section IV-A, explicit changes that do 
not contain a sufficiently high amount of implicit distortions 
should not be used as a watermark. In other words, a threshold 
should be chosen for the minimum amount of implicit 
distortions. This section analyzes some thresholds, represented 
as the SAD: (i) SAD 0≥ , meaning that all explicit changes are 
used as a watermark, (ii) SAD ≥1 , meaning only explicit 
changes that generate no implicit distortions are eliminated, and 
(iii) SAD ≥ 100 000 , meaning that only explicit changes with a 
very high amount of implicit distortions are retained.  
Table III shows the detection and false positive rates that 
were obtained by attacking and extracting all 2433 
watermarked versions of BlowingBubbles, and using the three 
above-described thresholds. The robustness is evaluated against 
a re-encoding attack with a QP of 20, 30, and 40. Recall that a 
lower QP results in a better quality than a higher QP. 
Additionally, the results are analyzed for sequences of 1 frame, 
50 frames and 500 frames. In the table, cells with a darker 
background represent worse results than cells with a lighter 
background. Note that the value p  in (3) is set to 1%.  
In part (i) of the table (i.e., SAD 0≥ ), it can be observed that 
using only a single frame is not robust. That is, the detection 
rate is very low (e.g., 57.67% for an attack QP of 40) and the 
FPR is very high (e.g., 46.90% for an attack QP of 40). This is 
because many explicit changes did not propagate sufficiently in 
the first frame yet. However, the robustness increases when 
more frames are used. For example, when 500 frames are used, 
the detection rate is 100% and the FPR is only 0.58%.  
In part (ii) of the table (i.e., SAD ≥1 ), a small increase in 
robustness can be observed compared to part (i). For example, 
TABLE III 
DETECTION AND FALSE POSITIVE RATES (%) OF BLOWINGBUBBLES 
Frames 
Detection rate False positive rate 
QP 20 QP 30 QP 40 QP 20 QP 30 QP 40 
 (i) SAD 0≥  
1 frame 100 99.88 57.67 28.52 29.14 46.90 
50 frames 100 100 94.08 2.14 2.10 7.89 
500 frames 100 100 100 0.58 0.58 0.58 
 (ii) SAD 1≥  
1 frame 100 99.88 57.98 28.14 28.80 46.65 
50 frames 100 100 94.55 1.65 1.61 7.43 
500 frames 100 100 100 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 (iii) SAD ≥100 000  
1 frame 100 100 99.21 5.16 5.16 5.56 
50 frames 100 100 95.37 0.67 0.67 6.55 




Algorithm SSIM Δ PSNR  
Detection 





Proposed method 0.966 0.14 100% 0.4% 3.6% 
Jiang et al. [16] 0.989 – 78% – 0.1% 
Chen et al. [17] – 0.06 76% – 0% 
Ma et al. [18] – 1.25 – – 3.6% 
Non-available values are represented by a dash (–). 
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the detection rate when using 50 frames and an attack QP of 40 
increases from 94.08% to 94.55%. Similarly, the corresponding 
FPR decreases from 7.69% to 7.43%. This is due to the 
elimination of the few explicit changes that did not generate any 
implicit distortions at all. 
In part (iii) of the table (i.e., SAD ≥ 100 000 ), all detection 
rates further increased, although using only 1 or 50 frames still 
does not result in a detection rate of 100% when a re-encoding 
attack with a QP of 40 is performed. The FPRs are also further 
decreased, although it is still relatively high for 1 frame. For 
500 frames, the false positive detection rate remains equal 
compared to part (ii), being 0.08%. These false positive 
detections are due to two explicit changes that both generate 
many implicit distortions, but whose implicit distortions are 
equal. Future work should be dedicated to eliminating such 
explicit changes and hence achieving a FPR of 0%.  
Note that one can exponentially increase the detection rate 
and decrease the FPR by using multiple segments for the 
detection. For example, in the case that 500 frames are used in 
combination with threshold (iii), the FPR is 0.0008 (0.08%). 
When using n  such segments, the FPR decreases to 0.0008
n
. 
Attackers do not limit themselves to re-encoding attacks. For 
example, they can perform an average collusion attack, in 
which multiple watermarked videos are averaged pixel by pixel, 
in an effort to deceive the detection algorithm [3], [6]. 
Traditional, collusion-secure algorithms solve this by inserting 
watermarked bit sequences with certain special characteristics. 
However, such techniques cannot be applied to the proposed 
watermarking approach in this paper, since there is no explicit 
control over the implicit distortions that represent the 
watermarked bit sequence. Therefore, the average collusion 
attack is briefly evaluated. Fig. 8 shows the correlation values 
after averaging the watermarked versions of BlowingBubbles 
corresponding to block no. 7 and no. 1000, followed by a re-
encoding with a QP of 20. Two outliers are observed, 
corresponding to the blocks that were used for the attack. Thus, 
this suggests that the proposed watermarking algorithm is 
robust against a collusion attack, although future studies should 
do a more extensive evaluation.  
Table I shows the detection rates and FPRs for the re-
encoding attack for some other sequences, when all frames (i.e., 
150, 500, or 600 frames, depending on the test sequence) are 
used in combination with threshold (iii). Recall that only 100 
random watermarks are used for these other sequences. One can 
observe that the detection rate is always 100% and the FPR is 
always 0%, except for the sequence Johnny, which has a FPR 
of 2%. These results are in line with those of BlowingBubbles. 
Table II compares the observed robustness results with those 
of several state-of-the-art techniques. Even when considering 
the FPR, the robustness of the proposed method is much higher 
than the algorithms by Jiang et al. and Chen et al. However, it 
should be noted that the detection rate is calculated differently 
in the state-of-the-art. That is, the number of detected bits is 
divided by the total number of embedded bits. As a result, they 
can use error correction codes to compensate for the lower 
detection rate [3]. However, the proposed method cannot apply 
such codes because the watermark is created automatically by 
the encoder, i.e., it is not embedded bit by bit. 
In conclusion, when many frames (e.g. 150 frames or more) 
are used for watermark embedding and extraction, and explicit 
changes that do not generate any implicit distortions are 
eliminated, detection rates of 100% are obtained for a re-
encoding attack up to a QP of 40. The corresponding false 
positive rate is relatively close to 0% and can be further 
increased by using multiple segments. 
D. Bit Rate Increase 
As mentioned in Section V-B, the set of coding decisions is 
not optimal anymore due to the explicit change. Therefore, it 
will also have a negative effect on the bit rate. That is, when 
one watermarks a video using the same QP as when not 
watermarking the video, the bit rate is expected to increase. 
Table I shows the average observed bit rate increase for several 
sequences, varying between 2.9% and 4.9%. 
These bit rate increases are similar to those obtained in the 
algorithm by Ma et al., as shown in Table II. However, 
watermarking techniques that preserve the bit rate have been 
developed as well, because a bit rate increase poses a problem 
for applications with strict bandwidth requirements. For 
example, the methods of Jiang et al. and Chen et al. report a bit 
rate increase of approximately 0%. In the proposed scheme, rate 
control could be applied while encoding and watermarking the 
video such that the bit rate increase would be nonexistent or 
negligible. However, it is expected that applying rate control 
would also result in an additional quality decrease. Therefore, 
future research should address this impact.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed a novel watermarking approach, based 
on so-called implicit distortions. These distortions are 
automatically generated by an encoder in which only a single 
coding decision is explicitly changed. Additionally, existing 
correlation-based detection techniques are extended by 
applying outlier detection. Several properties of the proposed 
scheme were evaluated. First, most explicit changes generate a 
very large collection of implicit distortions when many frames 
are available for inter-frame propagation. Secondly, although a 
small objective quality decrease is observed, the implicit 
distortions are considered subjectively imperceptible. Thirdly, 
 
Fig. 8.  Correlation values with all watermarks after applying a collusion attack 
by averaging block no. 7 and no. 1000, followed by a re-encoding with a QP 
of 20. The values corresponding to the colluding blocks are clearly outliers. 
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for video segments of several seconds long, a detection rate of 
100% was obtained in combination with a false positive rate 
close to 0%, when eliminating watermarks that do not generate 
a sufficient amount of implicit distortions. Lastly, a small 
increase in bit rate was observed. 
In conclusion, the proposed watermarking technique can be 
applied to help combat piracy. That is, the introduced 
watermark can identify malicious consumers of video services 
that illegally distribute a video, even when they significantly 
lower the quality in an effort to delete the watermark. Moreover, 
the proposed scheme requires no modification of existing CE 
devices. 
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